EU Inaction on Minority Rights

Knut Vollebaek - OSCE High Commissioner on Minorities

The construction of a national idea in the post-Communist region has often been connected to the dichotomy between majority and minority groups, which were seen as “frozen” conflicts during the Communist period and have since resurfaced in the form of language conflicts. Whether with Latvia’s stringent language requirements for citizenship or Azerbaijan’s decision to replace the Cyrillic alphabet with the Latin, language has played an important role in shaping the national image of many post-Communist states.

The ongoing row between Slovakia and Hungary over the recently amended Slovak State Language Law speaks to the preoccupation with constructing a post-Communist national ideal and reflects the symbiotic relationship between both regional historical legacies and the current inability of the EU to make good on its role as a “rights-based union”. Throughout the transition period, the EU used the appeal of membership and the requirements of accession criteria to temper some of the historical legacies in Central and Eastern Europe by attempting to bring the region in line with what it promoted as “European” norms and standards for minority protections. But the EU’s inability to formulate comprehensive and enforceable standards for minority rights protections means that historical legacies, which have no place in contemporary European policy, are allowed to thrive and influence policy making.

With the Balkans setting an example of just how dangerous ethnic and minority disputes could become, the EU was keen to curb any potential tensions in its Eastern neighbours. But by establishing a hierarchical relationship vis-à-vis Central and Eastern Europe, the EU exposed a double standard in its stance towards minority protections; while many Western European states have yet to sign and ratify supposedly major documents that would enshrine minority rights protections, such as the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM), ratification of the document became, for many of the acceding states, a way of demonstrating their commitment to protect minority rights. However, with “old” European states such as Belgium and France refraining from signing and ratifying the FCNM and a lack of effective mechanisms for implementation and enforcement of the values enshrined in the FCNM, the EU’s commitment to the protection of minority rights lacks a certain enthusiasm. Because of its questionable commitment to minority issues, the EU now finds itself in a difficult position when it comes to mediating the language dispute between Slovakia and Hungary.

Post-Communist Slovakia faced a dual-transition; from Communism to democratic capitalism and from federalism to full independence. Having spent the better part of the last thousand years under the tutelage of Hungarian control and only the last 16 years as an independent state following their divorce from the Czechs, the Slovak government has frequently used language policy as a means of asserting Slovak nationalism in an attempt to consolidate the reversal of the historical ethnic power structure in the region. The presence of minorities serves as a “disturbing reminder that in political terms, Slovakia was not always Slovak.” A preoccupation with the fragility and novelty of the Slovak state has been decisive in formulating policy in Slovakia and there exists a strong tendency to create policy to “correct” perceived past injustices.

Once an imperial power, Hungary has, over the course of the previous century, experienced a radical re-organisation of its borders and a sharp decline in its territorial possessions. With a significant number of ethnic Hungarians living outside of its borders, Hungary has developed a trans-sovereign approach to minority rights protections which it considers to help to preserve the cultural and linguistic rights of its kin-minorities abroad. The Hungarian government has looked on developments such as the various language laws adopted by Slovakia during the 1990s and the 2000s as acts of aggression towards their ethnic kin across the border.

Whereas the EU had no qualms about voicing its concern for the 1995 State Language Law in Slovakia, which, among other things, elevated Slovak to the status of official language with precedence over all other languages spoken on the territory and was justified on the grounds that it acted as a “remedy for historical grievances regarding the treatment of the Slovak language under Hungarian rule”, its reaction to the amended 2009 State Language Law has been muted. The Law, which came into effect on 1 September, supersedes a law which in 1999 amended the controversial 1995 law and made Slovak language policy more acceptable to the EU. In its 1999 incarnation, the Slovak Language Law introduced the Slovak language as an integrating factor in society and granted national minority groups constituting at least 20 per cent of a municipality the right to use their language in all official contacts with government and to use their language in, for example, local signage, court proceedings and medical visits.

The 2009 amendment, however, has been criticised by observers for “effectively ban[ning] minority language from the broadly-defined ‘public’ realm” and for imposing steep fines for “incorrect” use of Slovak and has received a cautious response from both the EU and the OSCE. The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Knut Vollebaek, released a statement following the Law’s adoption stating that it is “essential that the implementation of the Act does not negatively affect the rights of person belonging to national minorities in Slovakia” and encouraging further bi-and trilateral dialogue on the issue. The Council of Europe has also indicated its willingness to examine the law for its conformity with EU laws.

Although the HCNM has said that “the Law does not (and cannot) imply a restriction of the linguistic rights of persons belonging to national minorities”, the OSCE seems to be missing the point entirely. If law-makers are capable of acknowledging the special position of the Czech language on Slovak territory, despite a long-felt inferiority complex in their relationship with Prague, it does not seem inconceivable that they could also acknowledge that although the relationship between Bratislava and Budapest has been oftentimes contentious, there are some undeniable facts that they must live with; the 520,000+ Hungarians living in Slovakia are not going anywhere (nor are the Ukrainians, Ruthenians or Romani, for that matter). In a Europe that promotes language learning, cross-cultural links and a famous “ever closer union of peoples”, it is ridiculous for a state to use language policy to marginalise, however symbolically, minority language speakers. The EU works with a system of “official” and “working” languages and that is the type of policy that it should promote within its member states; it is time that we shift the importance of language away from its nationalist symbolism to its practical and communicative merit.

The active participation of the EU and the Council of Europe during the accession process of Slovakia proved sufficient to bring about changes to domestic language and minority rights policy. But this involvement has not been repeated with the latest incarnation of the Slovak State Language Law. While it has drawn much criticism from European and international observers, the response from the bodies that should be most concerned about an escalation of the dispute has been limited. Neither the EU nor the OSCE has taken a decisive stance on the issue; instead, they have offered up tepid reaction and characteristically vague assertions of their commitment to “remain engaged” and to “assist” Slovakia and Hungary in resolving the issue.